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An anti-folk theorem for ﬁnite past equilibria in repeated games
with private monitoring
Marcin P ˛ eski
Department of Economics, University of Toronto
We prove an anti-folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We
assume that the strategies have a ﬁnite past (they are measurable with respect
to ﬁnite partitions of past histories), that each period players’ preferences over
actions are modiﬁed by smooth idiosyncratic shocks, and that the monitoring is
sufﬁcientlyconnected. Inallrepeatedgameequilibria,eachperiodplayisanequi-
librium of the stage game. When the monitoring is approximately connected and
equilibriumstrategieshaveauniformlyboundedpast, theneachperiodplayisan
approximate equilibrium of the stage game.
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1. Introduction
The basic result of the repeated game literature, the folk theorem, shows that any fea-
sible and individually rational payoff can be attained in an equilibrium when players
are sufﬁciently patient (Rubinstein 1979, Fudenberg and Maskin 1986, Fudenberg et al.
1994). Recent results extend the folk theorem to classes of repeated games with private
monitoring (ElyandVälimäki2002, Matsushima2004, Hörner and Olszewski2006). The
equilibrium strategies constructed in these results are very complex; the strategies often
depend on minute details of past histories. It is hard to imagine that such strategies can
be used in real-world interactions.
This paper argues that the folk theorem fails when the environment is sufﬁciently
rich and the players have a limited capability of processing information. We make three
assumptions.
1. Weassumethattheprivatemonitoringisinﬁnite(i.e.,ithasinﬁnitelymanysignals)
and connected. To explain the last property, observe ﬁrst that given the players’
strategies, each private signal leads to ex post beliefs about the realized actions
and signals of the other players. We say that the monitoring is connected if each
player’s space of signals cannot be divided into two sets so that the beliefs induced
by the signals from the ﬁrst set are signiﬁcantly different from the beliefs induced
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bythesignalsfromtheotherset. Weshowthatconnectednessisagenericproperty
of monitoring technologies with inﬁnitely many signals.
2. We assume a ﬁnite past, i.e., each period’s continuation strategies are measurable
with respect to ﬁnite partitions of the past histories. The ﬁnite past assumption
bites only because the connected monitoring has inﬁnitely many signals. Because
the assumption’s absence requires players to handle inﬁnite amounts of informa-
tion, the assumption does not seem too restrictive.
3. Finally, we assume that, in each period, the payoffs are affected by smooth inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) shocks. The payoff shocks correspond
to idiosyncratic events that modify the stage-game preferences over actions.
The main result shows that, in any repeated game equilibrium, each period play is
an equilibrium of the stage game. The result is a simple consequence of the follow-
ing observations. Because the monitoring is connected, the set of beliefs induced by i’s
past histories is topologically connected. Because each period’s payoffs are affected by
smooth i.i.d. shocks, the probability that player i plays action ai in period t is contin-
uous in the expected continuation payoffs and, as a consequence, in the beliefs about
the opponents’ private histories. Because the continuation strategies are measurable
with respect to a ﬁnite partition of past histories, the probability of playing ai is con-
stant over each of the elements of the partition. Finally, the result follows from the fact
that any continuous function that is constant over the elements of ﬁnite partition of a
topologically connected set must be constant over the entire set.
Our result helps to clarify the assumptions behind the folk theorems in repeated
games with private monitoring. The inﬁnite and connected monitoring eliminates the
possibility of constructions based on ﬁnite, almost-public monitoring, as in Mailath
and Morris (2002, 2006), Hörner and Olszewski (2009), and Mailath and Olszewski
(2011). The smooth payoff shocks eliminate belief-free equilibria (Ely and Välimäki
2002, Piccione 2002, Ely et al. 2005). The ﬁnite past condition excludes the possibility of
ﬁne tuning strategies in the belief-based constructions of Sekiguchi (1997)a n dBhaskar
and Obara (2002). In fact, each of the assumptions is necessary for the result in the fol-
lowing sense: If the monitoring is ﬁnite, or the strategies can have an inﬁnite past, or
there are no smooth shocks, there exist repeated games with nontrivial equilibria (i.e.,
equilibria that are not repetitions of the stage-game equilibria).
Aversionofthemainresultholdswhentheconnectednessassumptionisweakened.
We measure the connectedness of monitoring ρ by the supremum C(ρ) over distances
between belief sets that are induced by two-element partitions of the players’ signals.
Then C(ρ) ∈[ 0 1] and monitoring ρ is connected if and only if C(ρ) = 0.T h e r e e x i s t
ﬁnite monitoring technologies with arbitrarily small (but strictly positive) C(ρ).As t r a t -
egy has a K-bounded past if the size of the partitions of the past histories that make
the continuation strategies measurable is uniformly bounded by K across all periods.
For example, ﬁnite automata strategies (Aumann 1981, Rubinstein 1986)h a v eb o u n d e d
pasts. We show that any equilibrium in strategies with a K-bounded past is a repetition
of the approximate stage-game equilibria. The approximation is better when the mem-
ory size K is smaller or the number of signals and the connectedness of the monitoringTheoretical Economics 7 (2012) Anti-folk theorem in repeated games 27
(inverse C(ρ)) are higher. The negative relation between the number of continuation
strategies and the number of signals stands in some contrast to the main message of the
literature of imperfect monitoring, where more signals usually lead to more outcomes.
Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) raise the importance of bounded rationality, while
discussing the robustness of public equilibria to small amounts of private monitoring.
Harsanyi (1973) introduces smooth payoff perturbations to show that a large class of
(static) mixed strategy equilibria can be puriﬁed, i.e., approximated by pure strategy
equilibria of incomplete information games. Bhaskar et al. (2008) study the puriﬁability
of strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma, and show that the one-period memory equilib-
riumofElyandVälimäki(2002)cannotbepuriﬁedbytheone-periodmemoryequilibria
of the perturbed game. Recently, Bhaskar et al. (2009) show that all puriﬁable equilibria
of repeated games of perfect information in bounded recall strategies are Markovian.1
In a companion paper, P˛ eski (2009) studies asynchronous repeated games with a ﬁnite
past and rich monitoring. The latter assumption is stronger than connectedness, and
requires that the set of induced beliefs is a connected and open subset of the space of
beliefs. Themainresultshowsthatanyequilibriumhasaversionofthebelief-freeprop-
erty: in each period t, the set of best responses does not depend on the information re-
ceived before period t, with a possible exception of the information received in the ﬁrst
period of the game. Additionally, if the payoffs are subject to smooth i.i.d. shocks, all
equilibria must be Markovian.
The next section presents the model and the deﬁnition of connected monitoring.
Section 3 deﬁnes connected monitoring and studies its genericity. Section 4 describes
the ﬁnite past assumption. Section 5 states and proves the main result. The last section
discusses the model and extensions.
2. Model
2.1 Notation
We start with some notation. For each measurable space X,l e tMX be the space of
(signed) measures on X with bounded total variation and let  X be the space of the
probability measures. For any measure π ∈  X and any integrable function f :X → R,
let π[f]=

X f(x)dπ(x)denote the integral of f with respect to π.F o ra n yπ ∈ MX,l e t
 π X =

x|π(x)| denote the total variation of measure π.
For each collection of sets X1     XN and for each i ≤ N, we denote X =× iXi for
theproductofthesetsand X−i =× j =iXj fortheproductofallsetsexcept Xi. Similarly,
if μ1     μN are measures on sets Xi,t h e nw ew r i t eμ =× iμi and μ−i =× j =iμj for
independent products of measures on, respectively, sets X and X−i.
2.2 Stage game
There are N players. Each player i observes random variable εi ∈[ 0 1], chooses action
ai from a ﬁnite set Ai, observes signal ωi from ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite set  i,a n d
1An early example of the use of payoff shocks to eliminate repeated game equilibria is contained in
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receives payoffs equal to the sum of complete information payoffs and payoff shock
ui(ai ωi εi) = gi(ai ωi)+βi(ai εi) 
Shocks εi are drawn independently across players from distribution λi ∈  [0 1].T h e
proﬁle of signals ω = (ω1     ωN) is drawn jointly from distribution ρ(a) ∈   ,w h e r e
a ∈ A is the proﬁle of actions. The function ρ:A →    is called the monitoring tech-
nology (or monitoring). We assume that |gi(ai ωi)|≤M for all actions ai and signals
ωi. We assume that βi(· ·) is a measurable function such that supεi ai |βi(ai εi)|≤1.2
Notice that βi(· εi) ∈ RAi
can be treated as a random variable (as a function of random
variable εi); we assume that the random variable βi(· εi) ∈ RAi
has a distribution with a
Lebesgue density bounded by L−|Ai| for some L ≥ 1.
A(stagegame)strategy ofplayeri isameasurablemappingαi:[0 1]→ Ai.W ew r i t e
αi(ai|εi)todenotetheprobabilityofactionai afterpayoffshockεi.L e tAi bethespaceof
strategies. A strategy proﬁle α = (α1     αN) ∈ A is an x (interim) equilibrium for some
x>0 if, forallplayers i, λi-almostall εi, andallactions ai ai  ∈ Ai,s u c ht h a tα(ai|εi)>0,
λ−i[α−i(ε−i)[ρ(ai a−i)[ui(ai ωi εi)]]] ≥ x+λ−i[α−i(ε−i)[ρ(ai  a−i)[ui(ai  ωi εi)]]] 
2.3 Repeated game
The stage game is repeated for inﬁnitely many periods, and shocks εi and signal pro-
ﬁles ω are drawn independently across time (and across players in the case of shocks).
In particular, in each period t, players observe shocks εi
t to payoffs in period t, choose
actions ai
t, and observe signals ωi
t.L e tHi
t = (Ai ×  i)t−1 and Ji
t =[ 0 1](t−1) be, respec-
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t−1).L e t Hi
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of inﬁnite histories.
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t ji
t):[0 1]→ Ai denote the
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egy at the beginning of period t after histories hi
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t. Each continuation strategy is an
element of the strategy space  i.










denote the repeated game payoffs of player i given inﬁnite histories hi
∞ and ji
∞.As t r a t -
egy proﬁle σ = (σ1     σN) induces a distribution over histories πσ ∈  (× iHi
∞ × Ji
∞).
Let Gi(σ) = πσ[Gi(hi
∞ ji
∞)] denote the expected payoff of player i given strategy pro-
ﬁle σ.
2The exact value of the bound on the payoff from shocks is not important.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Anti-folk theorem in repeated games 29
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁ l eσ is an equilibrium if, for each player i, for each strategy si,
Gi(σ) ≥ Gi(si σ−i). We do not require that the equilibrium satisfy any notion of sub-
game perfection. Because of the negative character of our result, not requiring subgame
perfection makes the result stronger.
The main results of this paper do not depend on the value of the discount factor.
In fact, the results of this paper do not change if the discount factor is not constant or
the game is played for ﬁnitely many periods. We focus on that case with constant dis-
counting and inﬁnitely many periods, because in that case, the comparison between
our results and the folk theorem literature is most striking.
3. Connected monitoring
Upon playing action ai and observing signal ωi,p l a y e ri forms beliefs about the actions
taken and signals observed by the opponents. The beliefs are based on the opponents’
strategies as well as the monitoring. For each mixed action proﬁle of the opponents’
strategies σ−i,e a c ha c t i o nai,a n de a c hs i g n a lωi,l e t
bρ(a−i ω−i|ai ωi;σ−i) =
ρ(ωi ω−i|ai a−i)σ−i(a−i)

ω −i a −i ρ(ωi ω −i|ai a −i)σ−i(a −i)
be the ex post belief that the other players played a−i and observed ω−i.T h e e x p o s t
beliefs bρ(ai ωi;σ−i) ∈  (A−i ×  −i) are well deﬁned if signal ωi has a strictly positive
probability for each action proﬁle a. In particular, the ex post beliefs are well deﬁned
when monitoring ρ hasfull support if, for eachplayer i,e a c ha c t i o np r o ﬁ l e(ai a−i),a n d
each signal ωi, ρ(ωi|ai a−i)>0.
We say that two signal–action pairs (ai ωi) and (ai  ωi ) are γ-close if the distance
between the induced beliefs is at most γ uniformly over the opponents’ strategies,
sup
σ−i∈ A−i
 bρ(ai ωi;σ−i)−bρ(ai  ωi ;σ−i) ≤γ 
We say that monitoring is (approximately) connected if it has full support and, for
each player i, the set of on-path action–signal pairs cannot be divided into two sets such
that the beliefs induced by the action–signal pairs from the ﬁrst set are signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from the beliefs induced by the action–signal pairs from the other set. Formally,
for any γ>0, monitoring ρ is γ-connected if, for each player i, the following conditions
are satisﬁed.
• For each action ai ∈ Ai andeachsubsetW    i,ther eexistωi ∈ W andωi  ∈  i\W
such that (ai ωi) and (ai ωi ) are γ-close.
• Forallactions ai ai  ∈ Ai,t h e r ee x i s tωi ωi  ∈  i suchthat (ai ωi) and (ai  ωi ) are
γ-close.
Notice that, with full support, the set of on-path action–signal pairs after histories
(hi
t ji
t+1) is equal to Ei × i,w h e r eEi is the support of mixed action σi
t(·|hi
t ji
t+1).T h e n ,
for any set W   Ei ×  i,t h e r ee x i s t(ai ωi) ∈ W and (ai  ωi ) ∈ (Ai ×  i) \ W that are30 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
γ-close. Indeed, there are two cases: If there are ai, ωi, ωi  such that (ai ωi) ∈ W and
(ai ωi ) ∈ (Ei× i)\W , thentheclaimfollowsfromtheﬁrst part ofthedeﬁnition; if not,
the claim follows from the second part.
Lettheconnectednessofmonitoringρ, C(ρ),beequaltotheinﬁmumoverγ>0such
that ρ is γ-connected. Say that the monitoring is connected if C(ρ)= 0. Any nontrivial
connected monitoring must be inﬁnite (i.e., | |=∞).
3.1 Genericity of connected monitoring technologies
Wesaythatmonitoringisextremelyrichifitssignalsapproximatesignalsfromanyother
monitoring. Formally, monitoring ρ is extremely rich if it has full support and for each
action ai, any other full support monitoring ρ ,a n ys i g n a lω i ∈  i,a n de a c hγ>0,t h e r e
exists a signal ωi ∈  i such that the beliefs induced by (ai ω i) under monitoring ρ  are
γ-closetothebeliefsinducedby (ai ωi) undermonitoring ρ uniformly overall distribu-
tions over the opponents’ actions
sup
σ−i∈ A−i
 bρ(ai ωi σ−i ρ)−bρ 
(ai ω i;σ−i) ≤γ 
Inanextremelyrichmonitoring, anybeliefabouttheopponents’actionsandsignals
is approximated by beliefs induced by some action–signal pairs. For example, there are
action–signal pairs that assign arbitrarily high weight to any single action proﬁle of the
opponent. Similarly, there are action–signal pairs that assign arbitrarily high weight to
the opponents’ signals that assign arbitrarily high weight to any of the player’s own ac-
tions or signals. It is easy to show that an extremely rich monitoring is connected (see
Lemma 1 in Appendix A).
Suppose that  i is countably inﬁnite for each player i.L e t  = (  )A be the space
of monitoring technologies. Deﬁne the norm on  :f o ra n yρ ρ  ∈  ,
 ρ−ρ    = sup
a
 ρ(a)−ρ (a)   
The norm makes   a Polish space. Recall that a II category subset of   contains a count-
able intersection of open and dense subsets. Because any Polish space is a Baire space,
a II category subset is nonempty and dense in  .
Theorem 1. The set of extremely rich monitoring technologies is II category in  .
Becauseextremelyrichmonitoringtechnologiesareconnected,thetheoremimplies
that the connected monitoring technologies are II category. Because II category sets are
dense, the theorem implies that any monitoring can be approximated by an extremely
rich, hence connected, monitoring.
Tomaketheideaofapproximationclearer,wearguethatanyconvexcombinationof
amonitoringwithﬁnitesupportandanextremelyrichmonitoringisextremelyrich. For
any two monitoring technologies ρ and ρ ,e a c hα ∈ (0 1), deﬁne a convex combination,
so that for all action and signal proﬁles a and ω,
(αρ+(1−α)ρ )(ω|a) = αρ(ω|a)+(1−α)ρ (ω|a) Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Anti-folk theorem in repeated games 31
Theorem 2. Take any monitoring ρ0 with ﬁnite support, i.e., such that there exists ﬁnite
set  0 ⊆   so that ρ0( 0|a) = 1 for each a ∈ A.I fρ is an extremely rich monitoring, then,
for any α ∈[ 0 1), monitoring αρ0 +(1−α)ρ is extremely rich.
Theorem 2 implies that any monitoring ρ with ﬁnite support can be approximated
by a sequence of extremely rich monitoring technologies that are obtained as convex
combinationsof ρ withsome(ﬁxed)extremelyrichmonitoring. TheproofsofTheorems
1 and 2 can be found in Appendix A.
Despite being generic in the sense described above, the connectedness assumption
eliminates some theoretically important types of private monitoring. For example, no
conditionally independent monitoring in the sense of Matsushima (2004)c a nb ec o n -
nected. Indeed, conditional independence requires that signals observed by a player
are independent from the signals observed by the opponents, given the action proﬁle.
In particular, given any action proﬁle of the opponents, two different actions of player i
may (and typically do) lead to very different sets of beliefs about the opponent’s actions,
regardless of player i’s signal. This may (and typically does) lead to a violation of the
second part of the deﬁnition of the connected monitoring.3
Below, we explain that public monitoring is not connected.
3.2 Comparison to public and almost-public monitoring
Monitoring ρ is public if the sets of signals are equal,  1 =···= N,a n da l lp l a y -
ers observe the same signal with full probability: For each action proﬁle a ∈ A,
ρ(ωi = ωj|a) = 1 for all i and j. A nontrivial (| i| > 1 for at least one player i) public
monitoring ρ is not connected and C(ρ) = 1. Indeed, for any two signals ωi  = ωi  of
player i, any action proﬁle a ∈ A, and any strategy proﬁle σ−i, the ex post beliefs after
signal ωi assign probability 0 to signal ωi  and
 bρ(ai ωi;σ−i)−bρ(ai  ωi ;σ−i) =1 
Say that the monitoring ρ  is γ-public if there exists public monitoring ρ that is γ-
close to ρ ,  ρ − ρ    ≤ γ. In other words, if monitoring ρ  is almost public, then the
player expects to receive a signal that is equal to the signals received by other players.
By Theorem 1, any public monitoring can be approximated by almost-public and con-
nected monitoring technologies.
The notion of closeness used in Theorem 1 (i.e., the norm  ·   )i sa nex ante notion
ofcloseness. Ifthesignalspaces 1 =···= N areﬁniteandthepublicmonitoringρhas
full support, then the ex ante notion implies a stronger interim notion. For sufﬁciently
small γ>0,f o re a c hs i g n a lωi ∈  i,p l a y e ri assigns at least 1 − γ probability to other
playersobserving thesamesignal ωi uniformlyacross signals ωi. In otherwords, players
alwaysassumethatthereisanapproximatecommonknowledgeoftheobservedsignals.
In such a case, an almost-public monitoring can be interpreted as a public monitoring
perturbedbymistakesinwhich,withsmallprobability,playersobservethepublicsignal
3I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.32 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
incorrectly. This interpretation is present in two recent papers that show the folk theo-
rem with almost-public monitoring and ﬁnite automata (Hörner and Olszewski 2009,
Mailath and Olszewski 2011). Notice that if γ is sufﬁciently small, then with ﬁnite signal
spaces, almost public monitoring is not connected.
In this paper, we assume that the signal space is inﬁnite. Then almost-public moni-
toring isnotclosetothepublicintheinterimsense. Forexample, thereexistsignalsthat
do not provide any information about the opponents’ signals or that provide informa-
tion that the opponents observed the public signal incorrectly. In a way, our notion of
closeness allows for moretypes thanthe notion ofcloseness based on ﬁnite type spaces.
4. Finite past
Ap l a y e ri’s strategy σi has a ﬁnite past if, in each period t, there exists a ﬁnite partition
 i
t of t-period histories Hi
t × Ji
t such that the t-period continuation strategy σi(hi
t ji
t)
is measurable with respect to  i
t. Equivalently, strategy σi has a ﬁnite past if, in each
period t, there are ﬁnitely many different continuation strategies. The ﬁnite past bites
only when the signal space and, as a consequence, the history space, is inﬁnite.
A strategy has a K-bounded past if, in each period t,s t r a t e g yσi induces ﬁnitely






t}| ≤ K<∞.A s t r a t e g y h a s
a bounded past if it has a K-bounded past for some K. Thus, a bounded past strategy
is a ﬁnite past strategy with a bound on the size of partitions of past histories that is
uniform across all periods.
The ﬁnite and bounded past generalize an assumption that is often used in the re-
peated game literature. Say that a strategy σi is implementable by a ﬁnite automaton if
there exists a ﬁnite set of continuation strategies  i
0 such that σi(hi
t ji
t) ∈  i
0 for each t
and each (hi
t ji
t).4 Clearly, a ﬁnite automaton has a ﬁnite and | i
0|-bounded past, but
not all bounded past strategies are implementable by ﬁnite automata.
These assumptions have a number of interpretations. First, ﬁnite and bounded past
capture a notion of complexity of repeated game strategies: Complex strategies depend
on inﬁnitely many details of past histories, whereas simple strategies depend only on
ﬁnite representation of the past.
Second, one can think about the ﬁnite past as an assumption about memory. In
general, the implementation of a strategy may require players to remember an inﬁnite
amountofinformation(ormoreprecisely,whichoftheinﬁnitelymanyfeasiblehistories
tookplace). Ifthelatterisimpossible,playersareforcedtouseﬁnitepaststrategies: they
must replace inﬁnitely many possible signals observed in any given period with a ﬁnite
partition of the signal space.
Finally, we describe an important consequence of the ﬁnite past assumption. Con-
sider an action taken by player i in period t. In general, this action depends on history
4Ourdeﬁnitionofﬁniteautomataisequivalenttothestandarddeﬁnitionwithstatesandtransitionfunc-
tions. One can think about states as continuation strategies. If transitions are not stochastic, then they are
directly determined by the associated continuation strategies. To model stochastic transitions, a minor
reinterpretation of εi
t shocks is required. The full generality of the model allows us to treat εi
t shocks as
composed of two parts: one that affects the value of function β(· ·), and one that does not and can be used





riod t. In other words, it is measurable with respect to some partition of Hi
t ×Ji
t ×[0 1].
Because the number of actions is ﬁnite, the partition can be chosen so that it has a ﬁnite
number of elements.
The ﬁnite past assumption requires that the partition can be chosen so that it has a
product representation. Indeed, if player i’s strategy has ﬁnite past, then the continua-
tion strategy at the beginning of period t is measurable with respect to ﬁnite partition
 i
t of the set of period t histories Hi
t × Ji
t. The interpretation is that, at the end of pe-
riod t −1, the detailed information contained in histories (hi
t ji
t) is effectively processed
and replaced by coarse information contained in an element of the partition π ∈  i
t.
The actual action played by player i in period t may also depend on the payoff shock
observed in period t.F o re a c hπ ∈  i
t,l e tsi
t(a;π)⊆[ 0 1] denote the subset of period t
payoff shocks such that action a is played after history (hi
t ji
t) ∈ π if and only if the pay-
off shock belongs toset si
t(a;π). That implies that theperiod t action is measurablewith
respect to the product partition  i
t × i
t,w h e r e i
t is a partition of set [0 1] generated by
{si
t(a;π)}a∈Ai π∈ i
t. Notice that partition  i
t consists of at most |Ai|| i
t| < ∞ elements.
One can think about the procedure of replacing a signal from an inﬁnite space by
an element of a partition of the space to which the signal belongs as information pro-
cessing. Then a ﬁnite past precludes that the information contained in history hi
t and
shock εi
t is processed simultaneously. In Section 6, we discuss the implications of an
alternative modelling choice with a different kind of information processing constraint.
5. Main result
The main result of the paper characterizes ﬁnite past equilibria in repeated games with
connected monitoring.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the monitoring is connected and that σ i sa( r e p e a t e dg a m e )
equilibrium in ﬁnite past strategies. Then, for each player i,f o re a c ht, there exists stage-
game proﬁle αi
t such that (i) αi
t = σi(·|ht jt), πσ-almost surely, and (ii) αi
t is an equilib-
rium of the stage game.
Theorem 3 has two parts. The ﬁrst part says that ﬁnite past equilibria are essen-
tially history-independent. Because any history-independent strategy has a ﬁnite past,
the theorem completely characterizes ﬁnite past equilibria. The second part is a simple
corollary to the ﬁrst: if the past does not affect the history, then in each period players
must play an equilibrium of the stage game.
We explain the intuition behind the theorem using a repeated game with two pe-
riods t = 1 2 and two actions for player i, Ai ={ a b}.5 Fix the strategies of the other
players σ−i and suppose that the monitoring is connected. We argue that if σi is the
5Insuch agame, theplayersactand receivepayoffsonly for two periods. Aswe commentedattheendof
Section2.3,themainresultsremainunchangedwhentherepeatedgameisplayedforﬁnitelymany(instead
of inﬁnitely many) periods.34 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
best response strategy of player i with a ﬁnite past, then player i’s period 2 action does
not depend on the signals and shocks observed in period 1.
Denote the expected difference between player i’s period 2 complete information










1) depends on the beliefs about the private histories of the other players after
observing history hi
1.
Similarly, deﬁne the difference between payoff shocks associated with actions a
and b,
βi(εi
2) = βi(a εi
2)−βi(b εi
2)  (1)
The assumptions on the payoff shocks imply that βi(εi
2) is chosen from a distribution
with a Lebesgue density. If strategy σi is the best response against the strategies of the





and action b if the inequality has the opposite sign.
Contrary to our claim, suppose that player i’s action in period 2 depends nontriv-
ially on period 1’s history. Based on the discussion from the previous section, there
exists a positive probability set S ⊆[ 0 1] of period 2 payoff shocks and partition of
H(a)∪ H(b)= Hi
1 such that for each shock εi
2 ∈ S,a c t i o nx is played after period 1 his-
tories in H(x). Because set S has positive probability and because of the assumptions
on function βi,t h e r ee x i s tεa εb ∈ S such that βi(εa)>β i(εb).B e c a u s eH(a)and H(b)
partition set Hi
1, and due to the connectedness of the monitoring, there exist sequences
ofhistorieshn a ∈ H(a)andhn b ∈ H(b)suchthatlimn i
2(hn a) = limn i
2(hn b).B u tt h e n ,
for sufﬁciently high n,e i t h e r
 i
2(hn b)+βi(εi
a)>0 or  i
2(hn a)+βi(εi
b)<0 
This leads to a contradiction to (2).
All three assumptions—inﬁnite and connected monitoring, ﬁnite past, and smooth
payoff shocks—are important for the theorem. The result may fail if the monitoring is
inﬁnite but not connected. For example, if the monitoring is public and it satisﬁes sufﬁ-
cient identiﬁability conditions, then the folk theorem in ﬁnite past strategies holds. This
claim follows from an appropriately modiﬁed standard folk theorem with ﬁnite public
monitoring (Fudenberg et al. 1994). Any public monitoring with inﬁnitely many signals
can be reduced to a ﬁnite monitoring with subsets of signals treated as a single signal.
(Someadditionalcareisrequiredtodealwithsmoothi.i.d.payoffshocks.) Indeed,when
the monitoring is ﬁnite, all strategies have a ﬁnite past and the ﬁnite past assumption
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The result may fail if the monitoring is private and ﬁnite. In Appendix D,w es h o w
that if players have sufﬁciently many actions and signals, and the ﬁnite monitoring sat-
isﬁes acertain generic property, thenthereexist repeatedgames with nontrivial equilib-
ria.6 More speciﬁcally, we construct payoffs and equilibria with the following property:
In odd periods, the actions do not depend on the past history and they form a strict
stage-game Nash equilibrium. In even periods, the actions nontrivially depend on the
signals observed in the preceding period and they form a correlated equilibrium of the
stage game with all best responses being strict. The constructed strategies remain a re-
peated game equilibrium even when payoffs are perturbed by sufﬁciently small shocks.
The theorem may fail if the monitoring is inﬁnitely connected, but the strategies are
not required to have a ﬁnite past. We use the construction from Appendix D to show
that for any monitoring (possibly inﬁnite and connected) that is appropriately close to
a ﬁnite monitoring with a certain generic property, there are nontrivial repeated game
equilibria in strategies without ﬁnite past. The idea is to take the construction of equi-
librium strategies from the game with ﬁnite monitoring and show that the construction
extends to sufﬁciently close inﬁnite monitoring. Note that Theorem 1 implies that each
ﬁnite monitoring can be approximated arbitrarily closely with connected (hence, inﬁ-
nite) monitoring technologies.
Finally, when there are no smooth payoff shocks, Ely and Välimäki (2002) show that
it is possible to approximate full cooperation in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma with
almost perfect monitoring. Because almost perfect monitoring technologies may be
connected, this indicates that the smooth payoff shocks are important for the result.
5.1 Approximately connected monitoring
D e ﬁ n ed i s t a n c eo nt h es p a c eo fs t a g e - g a m es t r a t e g i e sAi:f o ra n yα α  ∈ Ai,l e t
 α−α  Ai =






Theorem 4. Suppose that σ is a (repeated game) equilibrium in K-bounded past strate-
gies. If C(ρ) < B, then, for each player i,f o re a c ht, there exists stage-game pro-
ﬁle αi
t such that (i)  αi
t − σi(·|ht jt) A <B −1KC(ρ), πσ-almost surely, and (ii) αi
t is a
(2MNKB−1/(1−δ))C(ρ) equilibrium of the stage game, πσ-almost surely.
By Theorem 4, any equilibrium in bounded-past strategies is approximately history-
independent and consists of a series of approximate stage-game equilibria. The quality
6A recent paper, Sugaya (2011), claims that the folk theorem holds for repeated games with ﬁnite private
generic monitorings. Sugaya’s construction relies heavily on belief-free techniques; for this reason, it is not
clear whether the result extends to games with ﬁnite monitoring and smooth payoff shocks.36 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
of approximation improves with the connectedness of the monitoring (i.e., it decreases
with C(ρ)) and decreases with the size of memory K.
The theorems remain true under various modiﬁcations of the basic model: For ex-
ample, the discount factors may differ across players or time, or the payoffs or the dis-
tribution of shocks may depend on time. Section 6 discusses how Theorem 3 changes
under an alternative speciﬁcation of the model timeline.
5.2 Weaker equilibrium notion
Recall that strategy proﬁle (σ1     σI) is an equilibrium if there exists no other strat-
egy σi  that is a proﬁtable deviation. If ﬁnite past is interpreted as a constraint on
memory, one may argue that proﬁtable deviations also have a ﬁnite past. Formally,
let  i <∞ be the set of strategies with a ﬁnite past. Say that ﬁnite past strategy pro-
ﬁle (σ1     σI) ∈× i i <∞ is a ﬁnite past equilibrium if for all players i and ﬁnite past
strategies σi  ∈  i <∞, Gi(σi  σ−i) ≤ Gi(σi σ−i). Similarly, let  i K denote the set of
strategies with K-bounded past and deﬁne K-bounded past equilibrium as the pro-
ﬁle of K-bounded past strategies such that there exists no proﬁtable K-bounded past
deviation.
It is easy to notice that Theorem 3 implies that any ﬁnite past equilibrium in games
with connected monitoring is a sequence of stage-game Nash equilibria. Indeed, this
follows from the fact that any (not necessarily ﬁnite past) strategy can be appropriately
approximated by ﬁnite past strategies.7 No similar result is known for K-bounded past
equilibria.
6. Alternative timeline and one-period memory
As we discuss in Section 5, ﬁnite past stops players from simultaneously processing in-
formation contained in the private history and the payoff shock. To analyze this inter-
pretation more deeply, we discuss a modiﬁcation of the model timeline that leads to a
different type of constraint.
So far, we have assumed that the shock to t-period payoffs εt
i is observed in the
beginning of period t. In this section, suppose that the shock εi
t to t-period payoffs
is observed in the end of period t − 1 (and the ﬁrst shock εi
1 is observed immediately
before period 1). This change implies that εt
i is part of a noninformative history ob-
served before period t and that Ji
t =[ 0 1]t (instead of Ji
t =[ 0 1]t−1). Let σ(hi
t ji
t),w h e r e
ji
t = (εi
1     εi
t), be the continuation strategies at the beginning of period t. The deﬁni-
tion of strategy σi with a ﬁnite past remains the same: A player i’s strategy σi has a ﬁnite
past if,ineachperiod t,thereexistsaﬁnitepartition  i
t of t-periodhistories Hi
t ×Ji
t such
that the t-period continuation strategy σi(hi
t ji
t) is measurable with respect to  i
t;a l t e r -
natively, strategy σi has a ﬁnite past if, in each period t, there are ﬁnitely many different
continuation strategies.
As in the original model, the ﬁnite past assumption makes it impossible for play-
ers to simultaneously process information that arrives in different periods. With the
7ThenotionofapproximationisanappropriateversionofL1 closeness,andtheaboveclaimisanalogous
to the fact that any measurable function can be approximated by step functions with ﬁnitely many steps.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Anti-folk theorem in repeated games 37
alternative timeline, this means that information prior to period t − 1 is processed sep-
arately from information (ai
t−1 ωi
t−1 εi
t) received in period t − 1.M o r e p r e c i s e l y , o n e
can show that player i action in period t must be measurable with respect to the prod-
uct of ﬁnite partitions  i
t−1 × i
t−1,w h e r e i
t−1 is a partition of histories observed before
period t − 1 and  i
t−1 is a (ﬁnite) partition of the space of observations in period t − 1,
Ai × i ×[0 1]. The difference between the original model and the alternative timeline
isthatinthelattercase,informationabouttheperiod t payoffshock εi
t canbeprocessed
(i.e., replaced by a ﬁnite partition) simultaneously with the action and signal observed
in period t −1, (ai
t−1 ωi
t−1).
We describe an important class of strategies with a ﬁnite past under the alternative
timeline. Say strategy σi has one-period memory if, for each t, there exist measurable
functions αi











Thus, period t action depends only on a partition of the space of observations in period
t − 1, Ai ×  i ×[ 0 1]. Because there are ﬁnitely many actions, such a partition  i
t−1
can be chosen to be ﬁnite. The actions in periods t  >tdo not depend on t − 1 or any
earlier information. In particular, the continuation strategy in the beginning of period t
is measurable with respect to ﬁnite partition {Hi
t−1 ×Ji
t−1}× i
t−1,w h e r e{Hi
t−1 ×Ji
t−1} is
the trivial partition of histories observed before period t −1.
Theorem 5. Consider the alternative timeline. Suppose that the monitoring is extremely
rich and that σ is a (repeated game) equilibrium in ﬁnite past strategies. Then, for each
player i,f o re a c ht, there exists a measurablefunction αi
















t) is a degen-
erate probability distribution concentrated only on one action.
With thealternative timelineand extremelyrich monitoring, allﬁnite past equilibria
have a one-period memory. The result provides a foundation for one-period memory
strategies. This contributes to the literature that analyzes the properties of such strate-
gies (for example, see Ely and Välimäki 2002 and Bhaskar et al. 2008).




t) must take values in pure
actions for almost all realizations of payoff shocks εi
t. Thus, with the exception of zero-
probability events, the strategies in each period depend on partition of the last period
strategies,wherethesizeofthepartitionisﬁniteanduniformlyboundedacrossperiods.
The intuition behind Theorem 5 is similar to the intuition behind Theorem 3.S u p -
pose that player i has only two actions, Ai ={ a b}, and that there are t<∞ periods. As
in the original model, the actions are continuous in beliefs and payoff shocks, and the
belief space is connected, so the same argument implies that only information received
in the same period as information about the recent payoff shock may affect period t ac-
tions. In the same time, period t actions might depend on action ai
t−1 and signal ωi
t−1,
because the action–signal pair (ai
t−1 ωi
t−1) is processed jointly with payoff shock εi
t.38 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
For each history hi
t,l e t (hi
t) denote the difference between the expected complete
information payoff (i.e., absent the payoff shock) from actions a and b in period t af-
ter observing history hi
t.A si nSection 5, we can show that if player i’s action depends
nontrivially on histories before period t − 1, then there exist a positive probability set
S ⊆ Ai × i ×[−1 1]Ai




| (hn a s)− (hn b s)|=0 for each s ∈ S
and such that player i plays action a after histories (hn a s)and plays action b after his-
tories (hn b s)for all s ∈ S. Due to the assumptions on the shock and because set S has
a positive probability, there are action and signal pairs (ai ωi) and shocks εa, εb such
that (ai ωi εa) (ai ωi εb) ∈ S and βi(εa)>β ( ε b) (recall that βi(ε) is deﬁned in (1)a s
the difference between shock payoffs from actions a and b). But then either
lim sup
n→∞
 (hn b ai ωi εa)>0 or lim inf
n→∞
 (hn a ai ωi εb)<0
and at least one of the actions a or b is not a best response after some histories. The
proof of the theorem can be found in Appendix C.
Appendix A: Genericity
Let  + ⊆   be the class of monitoring technologies with full support. Let  ∗ ⊆  + be the
set of extremely rich monitoring technologies.
A.1 Extremely rich monitoring is connected
Lemma 1. Each extremely rich monitoring is connected.
Proof. Each action–signal (ai ωi) and monitoring ρ can be represented by a belief
mapping bρ(ai ωi): A−i →  (A−i × −i),w h e r e
bρ(ai ωi)(σ−i) = bρ(ai ωi;σ−i) 
Let B be the space of all continuous mappings b: A−i →  (A−i × −i) and let
B∗ ={ bρ(ai ωi):(ai ωi) ∈ Ai × i ρ∈  +} 
Then B∗ isthesetofbeliefmappings. Onechecksthat,withthesupnorm, B∗ isaconvex
(hence, connected) subset of B. Moreover, if monitoring ρ is extremely rich, then for
each action ai,s e t
Bρ(ai) ={ bρ(ai ωi):ωi ∈  i}
is a dense subset of B∗.
Suppose that monitoring ρ is extremely rich. We check that ρ satisﬁes the ﬁrst con-
dition of the deﬁnition of a connected monitoring. Take any action ai ∈ Ai and subsetTheoretical Economics 7 (2012) Anti-folk theorem in repeated games 39
W    i.L e t
B0 ={ bρ(ai ωi):ωi ∈ W }
B1 ={ bρ(ai ωi):ωi ∈  i \W } 
Then B0 ∪ B1 = Bρ(ai).B e c a u s e ρ is extremely rich, clB0 ∪ clB1 = B∗.B e c a u s e B∗ is
connected, clB0 ∩ clB1  = ∅ and, for each γ>0, there exist belief mappings b0 ∈ B0 and
b1 ∈ B1 such that
sup
σ−i
 b0(σ−i)−b1(σ−i) ≤γ 
The signals associated with these belief mappings are γ-close.
Wecheckthesecondcondition. Takeanytwoactionsai ai  ∈ Ai.B e c a u s ec lBρ(ai) =
Bρ(ai ),f o re a c hγ>0,t h e r ee x i s tb ∈ Bρ(ai) and b  ∈ Bρ(ai ) such that
sup
σ−i
 b(σ−i)−b (σ−i) ≤γ 
The signals associated with these belief mappings are γ-close. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 2. For each ε>0, full support monitoring ρ ,p l a y e ri,a c t i o nai,a n ds i g n a lω ,
there exists an open and dense subset U ⊆   such that for each ρ ∈ U, there exists signal
ω ∈  i so that
sup
σ−i∈ A−i
 bρ(ai ω;σ−i)−bρ 
(ai ω ;σ−i) ≤ε 
Proof.F i x p l a y e r i, monitoring ρ ,a c t i o nai,a n ds i g n a lω . We show that for each η>0
and each monitoring ρ∗, there exist monitoring ρ0 and signal ω such that  ρ∗ −ρ0 ≤η,
and for each σ−i ∈  A−i,
bρ0(ai ω;σ−i) = bρ 
(ai ω ;σ−i)  (3)
Indeed, assume without loss of generality that 1/(1− 1
100η) ≤ 2. Find a signal ω ∈  i
such that supa−i ρ∗(ω|ai a−i) ≤ 1
100η.L e tρ∗∗ be a monitoring such that for each action
proﬁle a, ρ∗∗(a) is equal to ρ∗(·|a) conditionally on the fact that the signal of player i is
not equal to ω:
ρ∗∗(a) = ρ∗(·|ωi  = ω|a) 








Because monitoring ρ  has full support, ρ0(ω|a) > 0 for each action proﬁle a and
bρ0(ai ω;σ−i) is well deﬁned. Because
ρ0(ω ω−i|a) = 1
100γρ (ω  ω−i|a)40 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
for each a and ω−i,( 3) holds for any distribution σ−i. Additionally,
 ρ∗ −ρ0 ≤  ρ∗ −ρ∗∗ + ρ∗∗ −ρ0 ≤ 2
100η+ 1
100η ≤ η 
Due to the continuity of conditional beliefs given positive probability signals, there
exists η  > 0 such that bρ0(ai ω;σ−i) is well deﬁned for each ρ so that  ρ−ρ0 ≤η  and
sup
σ−i∈ A−i
 bρ(ai ω;σ−i)−bρ 
(ai ω ;σ−i) ≤2η 
The lemma follows. 
Lemma 3. For each player i and each signal ωi, there exists an open and dense subset
U ⊆   such that for each ρ ∈ U, ρ(ωi|a) > 0 for each proﬁle a ∈ A.
Proof.F i x p l a y e r i and signal ωi. We show that for each η>0 and each monitoring ρ∗,
there exists monitoring ρ such that  ρ − ρ∗ ≤η and ρ(ωi|a) > 0 for each proﬁle a ∈ A.
Indeed, assume without loss of generality that η<1.
Deﬁne monitoring ρ. For each proﬁle a such that ρ∗(ωi|a) > 0,l e tρ(ω|a) = ρ∗(ω|a)
for each signal proﬁle ω ∈  .I fρ∗(ωi|a) = 0, then take any distribution μ ∈   −i,a n d
let
ρ(ωi ω−i|a) = ημ(ω−i)
and
ρ(ωi  ω−i|a) = (1−η)ρ∗(ωi  ω−i|a) for each signal ωi  ∈  i \{ωi} 
Then  ρ−ρ∗ ≤η and ρ(ωi|a) > 0 for each a ∈ A.
The continuity of measure implies that there exists η  > 0 such that for each moni-
toring ρ  suchthat ρ−ρ  ≤η , ρ(ωi|a) > 0 foreachproﬁlea ∈ A. Thelemmafollows. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Because space   is separable,  + is separable and there exists a
countable dense subset  +
0 ⊆  +. Due to the continuity of conditional beliefs given pos-
itive probability signals, for each ρ  ∈  +,a c t i o nai,a n dω  ∈  i, there exists a sequence
ρ 







n(ai ω ;σ−i)−bρ 
(ai ω ;σ−i) =0 
For each q = (ai ω  ρ  m)∈ Ai × i × +
0 ×N,u s eLemma 2 to ﬁnd open and dense
set Ui
q ⊆   such that for each ρ ∈ Ui
q,t h e r ee x i s t ss i g n a lω so that
sup
σ−i∈ A−i
 bρ(ai ω;σ−i)−bρ 




For each player i and signal ωi,u s eLemma 3 to ﬁnd open and dense set Ui
ωi ⊆   such
that for each ρ ∈ Ui
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Then U∗ ⊆  ∗ and U∗ is a II category subset of  . 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Let ρ  = αρ0 +(1−α)ρ.B e c a u s eα<1, ρ  has full support. There are ﬁnite sets of signals
 i
0 ⊆  i such that ρ0(× i i
0|a) = 1 for each a ∈ A. Signals ωi / ∈  i
0 do not occur with
positive probability under monitoring ρ0. Hence, for each action–signal pair (ai ωi)
such that ωi / ∈  i
0, the associated ρ  ex post beliefs given ai and ωi are equal to the ρ ex
post beliefs given the same pair and the same distribution over opponents’ actions,
bρ(ai ωi;σ−i) = bρ 
(ai ωi;σ−i) 
Because ρ is extremely rich,  i
0 is ﬁnite, and for each action ai, and any other moni-
toring ρ  ,a n ys i g n a lω   ∈  i,e a c hγ>0, there exists a signal ωi ∈  i \  i
0 such that the
beliefs induced by (ai ω  ) under monitoring ρ   are γ-close to the beliefs induced by
(ai ωi) under monitoring ρ uniformly over all distributions over opponents’ actions,
sup
σ−i∈ A−i
 bρ(ai ωi σ−i ρ)−bρ 
(ai ω i;σ−i) ≤γ 
It follows that monitoring ρ  is extremely rich.
Appendix B: Proofs of results from Section 5
B.1 Proof of Theorems 3 and 4
The theorems follow from the following three lemmas. The proofs of the lemmas can be
found in Sections B.5–B.7.
Fix equilibrium σ. The ﬁrst result establishes an equilibrium continuity of actions
and ε-shock payoffs with respect to the beliefs. For each player i and each history hi t
that occurs with positive πσ probability, let πi σ(hi t) ∈  (H−i
t ×J−i
t ) denote the equilib-
rium beliefs of player i about the private histories of the opponents. For all histories hi
t
and ji





















t  ji 


















t <B, then there exists an action ai ∈ Ai that is played with
positive probability after histories (hi
t ji
t) and (hi 
t  ji 
t ).42 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
We explain the ﬁrst bound in (4). The bound says that the probability of εi
t for which
the action played after history (hi
t ji
t εi
t) is different from the action played (hi 
t  ji 
t  εi
t)
can be bounded by the difference between the beliefs induced by the respective histo-
ries. To see why, ﬁx an action ai
t. The payoff consequences of playing ai
t can be divided
into thecurrentcompleteinformation gamepayoffs, thecurrentpayofffromshock, and
the future continuation payoffs. The sum of the current complete information game
payoffsandfuturecontinuationpayoffsdepends,andiscontinuousin,thebeliefsabout
the private histories of the opponents. Trivially, the current payoff from the shock de-
pends only on the realization of εi
t.T h u s , f o r a n y εi
t,i fa c t i o nai




t), and the beliefs induced by histories (hi
t ji
t) and (hi 
t  ji 
t ) are
sufﬁciently close, then ai
t is an almost best response after history (hi 








becomes the best response after (hi
t ji
t ε 
t) and (hi 
t  ji 
t  ε 
t). Similarly, if ai




t), then it is not the best response after (hi
t ji
t ε 
t) and (hi 
t  ji 
t  ε 
t)
for nearby shocks ε 
t that are slightly less favorable toward ai
t. Thus, for the majority of
shocks εi
t, the actions played after histories (hi
t ji
t εi
t) and (hi 
t  ji 
t  εi
t) are similar.
The second bound follows from the ﬁrst, and the last part of the lemma is a conse-
quence of the fact that if stage-game strategies σi(·|hi
t ji
t) and σi(·|hi 
t  ji 
t ) have disjoint
support, then their  ·  Ai distance is equal to 1.
The second result shows that if the monitoring is approximately connected, then for
any strategy proﬁle and any division of the positive probability histories into two sets,
there are histories on both sides of the division with close beliefs.
Lemma 5. Take any set F   Hi
t of histories such that 0 <π σ(F) < 1.I f C(ρ)<B,t h e n
there are πσ-positive probability histories hi
t ∈ F and hi 
t ∈ Hi





t ≤ 50C(ρ)  (5)
Suppose that the strategies in equilibrium proﬁle σ have a ﬁnite past. Fix player i.
For each t<∞,l e tH
i σ
t ⊆ Hi





t }| < ∞ be the number of continuation strategies that are played by
player i starting from period t.I fσi has a K-bounded past, then Kt ≤ K for each t.L e t
F1     FKt ⊆ H
i σ
t × Ji
t be a partition of H
i σ
t × Ji
t into disjoint sets such that, for each
k ≤ Kt, continuation strategies after histories (hi
t ji
t) (hi 
t  ji 
t ) ∈ Fk are equal.
Consider a graph   with Kt nodes such that there is an edge between nodes k and
k  if and only if there exist histories (hi
k t ji
k t) ∈ Fk and (hi
k  t ji
k  t) ∈ Fk  such that
 πi σ(hi
k t) − πi σ(hi 
k t) H−i
t ×J−i
t ≤ 50C(ρ).B y Lemma 4, and because of the choice of
sets Fk, if there is an edge between nodes k and k , then inequalities (4) hold for all
(hi
t ji
t) ∈ Fk, (hi 
t  ji 
t ) ∈ Fk ,a n dx = B−1C(ρ).
By Lemma 5,i fC(ρ) < B,t h e ng r a p h  is connected, i.e., there is a path of links
between each pair of nodes. Because the minimum length of such a path is bounded
by Kt,i tm u s tb et h a t ,f o ra l lπσ-positive probability histories, inequalities (4) hold for
πσ-almost allhistories (hi
t ji
t) and (hi 
t  ji 
t ) with x = B−1KtC(ρ)if C(ρ)>0 and any x>0
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The last lemma shows that inequalities (4) for sufﬁciently small x imply an approxi-
mate equilibrium of the stage game.




t  ji 
t ).T h e n ,
for all players i and πσ-almost all histories (hi
t ji
t), (mixed) action proﬁle σi(·|hi
t ji
t) is
(2MN/(1−δ))x equilibrium of the stage game.
B.2 Preliminary results
Suppose that V is a normed vector space with norm  ·  ∗.
Lemma 7. For all f f  ∈ V ,  (1/ f ∗)f −(1/ f  ∗)f  ∗ ≤ 2 f −f  ∗/ f ∗.









































 f −f  ∗ +
| f  ∗ − f ∗|
 f  ∗
 f  ∗

≤ 2
 f −f  ∗
 f ∗
  
Take any countable sets X and Y.F o re a c hπ ∈  X and each function f :X →  Y,
deﬁne probability distribution π ∗f ∈  (X ×Y),
(π ∗f)(x y) = π(x)f(y|x) 
For each π ∈  (X × Y),f o re a c hy ∈ Y such that π(y) > 0,l e tπ(·|y)∈  X denote the
conditional distribution given y.
Lemma 8. For any countable sets X, Y,a n dZ,a n yt w om e a s u r e sπ π  ∈  X, and any
function f :X →  (Y ×Z), there exists y0 ∈ Y such that (π ∗f)(y0) (π  ∗f)(y0)>0 and
 (π ∗f)(·|y0)−(π  ∗f)(·|y0) X×Z ≤ 2 π −π  X 




|π(x)−π (x)|f(y0 z|x) ≤  π −π  X

x z
π(x)f(y0 z|x)  (6)
If not, then
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which yields a contradiction. Inequality (6)i m p l i e st h a t
(π  ∗f)(y0) ≥ (1− π −π  X)(π ∗f)(y0)>0 
The lemma follows from Lemma 7. 
Lemma 9. For all countable sets X1     XN,a n df o rX =× iXi and probability mea-
sures πi π 
i ∈  Xi, i = 1     N,i fπ =× iπi and π  =× iπ 
i ∈  X are independent prod-
uct measures, then
 π −π  X ≤

i
 πi −π 
i Xi 
Proof. It is enough to show the claim for n = 2.T h e n

















=  π2 −π 
2 + π1 −π 
1   
B.3 Close signals
Lemma 10. For each monitoring with full support ρ, for any two γ-close action–signal
pairs (ai ωi) and (ai  ωi ), there exists a constant c∗ such that, for all a−i,
 ρ(ωi ·|ai a−i)−c∗ρ(ω  ·|ai  a−i)  −i ≤ 11γρ(ωi|ai a−i) 











 ≤ γ 
Additionally, we show that for all γ ≤ 1
10,a l la−i and a−i
∗ ,
ρ(ωi |ai  a−i)






≤ (1+10γ)2ρ(ωi |ai  a−i)
ρ(ωi |ai  a−i
∗ )
 
It is enough to show that the ﬁrst inequality holds for all a−i and a−i
∗ .O nt h ec o n t r a r y ,






 β   =
ρ(ωi |ai  a−i)
ρ(ωi |ai  a−i
∗ )
  and s =
1
1+β
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Then s = (1 − s)β. Consider a distribution σ−i such that σ−i(a−i) = s and σ−i(a−i
∗ ) =
1−s.T h e n























∗ )ρ(ωi |ai  a−i)





 ≤ 10γ 
Fix a strategy proﬁle a−i




ρ(ωi |ai  a−i
∗ )
 
Then, for all a−i,




 ρ(ωi ·|ai a−i)−
ρ(ωi|ai a−i)
ρ(ωi |ai  a−i)











ρ(ωi |ai  a−i)
ρ(ωi  ·|ai  a−i)−
ρ(ωi|ai a−i
∗ )
ρ(ωi |ai  a−i
∗ )























∗ )ρ(ωi |ai  a−i)





≤ 11γρ(ωi|ai a−i)  
B.4 Connected monitoring
For each player i,periodss<t,saythathistoryhi
t = (hi
s ai
s     ωi
t−1)isacontinuationof
history hi
s and write ht ≥ hs. Similarly, deﬁne continuation of uninformative histories ji
t.
Let πJ ∈  (× iJi
∞) denote the (strategy-independent) distribution over uninformative
histories.
For each player i and strategy σi ∈  i, say that informative history hi
t is σi-consistent
with strategy σi ∈  i if there exists a πJ-positive probability set of uninformative histo-
ries J ⊆ Ji
t+1 such that for each ji





t a k e ni np e r i o ds is chosen with positive probability by strategy σi, σi(ai
s|hi
s ji
s+1)>0.46 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Because of full support, for any proﬁle σ, an informative history has positive πσ prob-
ability if and only if it is σi-consistent. In particular, if proﬁle σ is an equilibrium, then
the continuation strategy after any consistent informative history and almost all unin-
formative histories is the best response. (Note that because we do not assume subgame





t denote the set of σi-consistent histories. For each s ≤ t and each
σi-consistent history hs,l e tHi
t(hs) := {ht ∈ H
i σi
t :ht ≥ hs} be the set of σi-consistent
t-period continuation histories of hs.
Lemma 11. Fix equilibrium σ and player i.F o re a c hσi-consistent history hi
t−1, and any
action–signal pairs w w  ∈ Ai ×  i that are γ-close for some γ, and such that histories
hi
t = (hi
t−1 w)and hi 
t = (hi
t−1 w ) are σi-consistent,
 πi σ(hi
t)−πi σ(hi 




1     ai
t−2 ωi
t−2), w = (ai ωi),a n dw  = (ai  ωi ). Find con-









t  E measurable
|πσ(hi








































































≤ 22γ  
B.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Fix player i. For each action ai,l e t i(ai) be the strategies s that always play ai in the ﬁrst
period: s(εi
1) = ai for each εi
1 ∈[ 0 1].Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Anti-folk theorem in repeated games 47
For all actions ai ai  ∈ Ai, each threshold x ∈ R, and each belief over the opponents’
histories π ∈  (H−i
t ×J−i













ai ai  
1
1−δ
(v(ai  π)−v(ai π))

 
Then, v(ai π) is the expected current and future continuation payoff minus the cur-
rent payoff shock from a strategy that starts with action ai.S e tE(ai ai  x)consists of
shocks εi such that the corresponding payoff shock to action ai is higher than shock to
ai  by some speciﬁed threshold. Set E(ai π)consists of shocks for which action ai is the





t εt)>0 only if εi
t ∈ E(ai πi σ(hi
t)) 
This observation can be used to show that for all histories (hi
t ji
t) and (hi 








































v(ai πi σ(hi 





Recall that the λi distribution of βi(· εi) ∈ RAi
has its Lebesgue density bounded by
L−|Ai|. Then, for all actions ai, ai ,a l lx y ∈ R,
λi(E(a a  y)\E(a a  x+y))≤ 1
2Lx 
Additionally, notice that function v(· ·) is Lipschitz continuous in π with constant M.I n
particular, for any two informative histories hi
t hi 
t ∈ Hi
t such that  πi σ(ht)−πi σ(ht) ≤
η, for each action ai,
 v(ai πi σ(hi
t))−v(ai πi σ(hi 
t ))
  ≤ Mη 




t  ji 









The second bound in (4) follows from the ﬁrst.
This shows the ﬁrst part of the lemma. The second part of the lemma follows from
the fact that if stage-game strategies σi(·|ht jt) and σi(·|h 
t j 
t) have disjoint support,
then  σ(·|ht jt)−σ(·|h 
t j 
t) Ai = 1.48 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
B.6 Proof of Lemma 5
There are two steps in the proof. First, we show that there exist a pair of histories that
lead to 50C(ρ)-close beliefs. Second, we show that we can choose these histories so
that they have positive πσ probability. In the proof, we use the notation introduced in
Appendix B.4.
Fix player i and period t,a n ds e tF   Hi
t. Say that set F is determined at history hi
s
for some s ≤ t if either Hi
t(hi
s) ∩ F = ∅ or Hi
t(hi
s) ⊆ F. Find s ≤ t and history hi
s−1 ∈ Hi
s−1
such that F is not determined at hi
s−1, but it is determined at each hi
s ≥ hi
s−1.D e ﬁ n es e t s
of action–signal pairs
D0 ={ (ai ωi) ∈ Ai × i:(hi
s−1 ai ωi) is σi-consistent}
F0 ={ (ai ωi) ∈ D0:Ht(hi
s−1 ai ωi) ⊆ F} 
B yt h ec h o i c eo fp e r i o ds, F0 is a nonempty and proper subset of D0.
There are action–signal pairs w ∈ F0 and w  / ∈ D0 \ F0 that are C(ρ)-close. Indeed, if
there are (ai ωi) ∈ F0 and (ai ωi ) ∈ D0 \ F0, then the claim is implied by the ﬁrst part
of the deﬁnition of connected monitoring; otherwise, the claim is implied by the second
part. Then histories hi
s = (hi
s−1 w) and hi 
s = (hi










s ≤ 22C(ρ)  (8)
We show that there exist σi-consistent histories ht
i and ht 
i that are continuations
of histories hs
i and hs 
i , and that induce 50C(ρ)-close beliefs. Let ξi be some s-period
continuation strategy of player i. (We put more care into the choice of ξi below.) Let
X = H−i
t−1
Y = (Ai × i)t−s
Z = (A−i × −i)t−s 
For each x,l e tf(x)∈  (Y × Z) be the distribution over s-period continuation histories
induced by strategy proﬁle σ−i (continued after private histories x) and continuation









t ≤ 50C(ρ) 
Although histories hs and h 
s are σi-consistent, histories (hi
s hi




We show that histories (hi
s hi
t−s) and (hi 
s  hi
t−s) are σi-consistent given an appro-
priate choice of the continuation strategy ξi and history hi
t−s. The argument follows
by induction on t = s s + 1    . Suppose that the inductive claim is proven for some
t ≥ s. Then there exist continuation strategy ξi and history hi





t−s) are σi-consistent and (5) holds. By Lemma 4, there exists an action ai ∈ AiTheoretical Economics 7 (2012) Anti-folk theorem in repeated games 49
that is played with positive probability after histories (hi
s hi
t−s) and (hi 
s  hi
t−s).C o n s i d e r
a continuation strategy ¯ ξi that is equal to ξi but such that ¯ ξi plays action ai with prob-
ability 1 after histories (hi
s hi
t−s) and (hi 









t ≤ 50C(ρ) 
By the choice of continuation strategy ¯ ξi, histories (hi
s hi




B.7 Proof of Lemma 6
For each player i,ﬁ xaσi-consistent inﬁnite history hi∗
∞ and a history ji∗
∞.D e ﬁ n eas t r a t -


























t) Ai ≤ x






Because the strategy proﬁle s does not depend on past histories, for some ht+1 ∈ Ht+1,
let




be the expected (t +1)-continuation payoff of player i given proﬁle s.
For each player i, history hi
t, and action ai,l e tV i σ(hi
t ai) be the expected continua-
tion payoff in period t +1 after player i chooses ai in period t,
V i σ(hi










t ai ωi) σ−i(h−i
t  ε−i
t  a−i ω−i))]]

 
Simple computations involving bounds (9) show that
|V i σ(hi




t)>0 for some action ai, histories (hi
t ji
t), and payoff shock εi
t,










t a)−V i σ(hi
t ai)| 
(11)
The lemma follows from (10)a n d( 11).50 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 5




t be the set of all πσ-positive probability histories.
Lemma 12. There exists a function ˆ σi:Hi




















and there exists a constant such that for each hi 
t−1 ∈ H
i σ
t−1,a l l(p f) ∈ Pi ×Fi,
 
ˆ σi(·|hi
t−1 (p f) ε)−σi(·|hi 














The proof of Lemma 12 follows from Lemma 11 and the argument from the proof of
Lemma 4. We omit the details.
The proof of Lemma 5 remains unchanged. This implies that for each γ>0,e a c h
subset of informative positive probability histories F ⊆ H
i σ
t−1,a c t i o nai
t−1,a n ds i g n a l
ωi
t−1 such that 0 <π σ(F ×{ (ai
t−1 ωi
t−1)})<1,t h e r ee x i s t sπσ-positive probability his-
tories hi











t ) ≤γ 








t−1) ∈ Fk are equal.
Let σi k be a (t −1)-period continuation strategy after histories in Fk.L e tˆ σi k :Pi ×Fi ×
[0 1]→ Ai be the function that is associated with σi k through the thesis of Lemma 12.
Lemma 13. For all k and k , ˆ σi k =ˆ σi k 
.
Proof.C o n s i d e r a g r a p h   with Kt−1 nodes such that there is an edge between nodes
k and k  if and only if, for each γ>0, there exist histories (hi
k t−1 ji
k t−1) ∈ Fk and
(hi
k  t−1 ji
k  t−1) ∈ Fk  such that  πi σ(hi




≤ γ. By the proof
of Lemma 5,g r a p h  is (graph-theoretically) connected, i.e., a path exists between any
two vertices.
Fix (p f) ∈ Pi×Fi. Supposethatvertices k and k  areconnectedwithan edge. Then



















Fix any actions ai k and ai k 
that are played with positive probability in the ﬁrst stage of
the continuation strategies σk and σk 
: σk(ak|∅)>0 and σk 
(ak |∅)>0.B e c a u s et h e
monitoring is extremely rich, there exist sequences of signals ωi n ui n ∈  i such that
θρ(ai k ωi n) → (p f) and θρ(ai k 
 ui n) → (p f) Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Anti-folk theorem in repeated games 51
Then, by Lemma 12, for almost all ε ∈[ 0 1],















































n→∞d(θρ(ai k ωi n) θρ(ai k 
 ui n))
= 0 
Thus, ˆ σi k =ˆ σi k 
for all k and k  that are connected by an edge in graph  .T h e
lemma follows from the fact that graph   is (graph-theoretically) connected. 









Find k and k  such that (hi
t−1 ji
t−1) ∈ Fk and (hi 
t−1 ji 


































Appendix D: Nontrivial equilibria with finite monitoring
In this appendix, we show that if players have sufﬁciently many actions and signals, the
monitoringisﬁnite, anditsatisﬁesacertaingenericcondition, thentherearegamepay-
offs such that the repeated game has nontrivial equilibria. First, we describe a generic
propertyofmonitoringtechnologies. Second,wedescribearepeatedgamewithoutpay-
off shocks and a nontrivial equilibrium of such a game. We construct payoffs and equi-
libria with the following properties: In odd periods, the actions do not depend on the
pasthistoryandtheyformastrictstage-gameNashequilibrium. Inevenperiods,theac-
tions nontrivially depend on thesignals observed in thepreceding period and theyform
a correlated equilibrium of the stage game with all best responses being strict. Third, we
argue that the constructed strategies remain a repeated game equilibrium even when
payoffs are perturbed by sufﬁciently small shocks. Finally, we use the same construc-
tion to show that there exist nontrivial equilibria without a ﬁnite past in a game with the52 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
same payoffs and possibly inﬁnite monitoring technologies that are sufﬁciently close to
the monitoring described in the ﬁnite case.
Fix ﬁnite signal spaces. Suppose that at least two players have at least ﬁve ac-
tions and at least two signals. Without any further loss of generality, assume that
|A1| |A2|≥5,a n d| 1| | 2|≥2. Consider monitoring technologies ρ that satisfy three
properties.
1. Full support.
2. Convex independence (CI): For each player i,e a c hp r o ﬁ l ea, the marginal distri-
bution over signals of player i given proﬁle a,m a r g  i ρ(a), does not belong to the
convex hull of marginal distributions given all other action proﬁles, {marg i ρ(a ) 
a  ∈ A\{a}}.
3. Strong identiﬁcation (SI): For all players i  = j,a c t i o np r o ﬁ l ea, any two signals
ωi ωi  ∈  i, and proper subset  
j
0    j,i fωi  = ωi ,t h e n
ρ( 
j
0|ωi a) = ρ( 
j
0|ωi  a) 
Here, ρ(ωj|ωi a)is the conditional probability of player j observing a signal in set
 
j
0 g i v e na c t i o np r o ﬁ l ea and player i observing signal ωi.
It is easy to check that when there are sufﬁciently many (but ﬁnitely many) signals,
the above properties are satisﬁed by an open, dense, and full Lebesgue measure subset
of all monitoring technologies.
F i xa na c t i o np r o ﬁ l ea∗ = (ai∗). Fix positive probability signal ω2∗ ∈  2. Find
p1 ∈ (0 1) and e1 > 0 such that sets
 1
− ={ ω1 ∈  1:ρ(ω2∗|ω1 a∗) ≤ p1 −e1}
and
 1
+ ={ ω1 ∈  1:ρ(ω2∗|ω1 a∗) ≥ p1 +e1}
are nonempty and  1 =  1
− ∪  1
+.L e t p2 = ρ( 1
+|ω2 a∗) and ﬁnd e2 > 0 such that
 2 =  2
− ∪{ω2∗}∪ 2
+,w h e r e
 2
− ={ ω2 ∈  2:ρ( 1
+|ω2 a∗) ≤ p2 −e2}
and
 2
+ ={ ω2 ∈  2:ρ( 1
+|ω2 a∗) ≥ p2 +e2} 
Such pi and ei exist because of SI.
By CI, we can ﬁnd payoff functions gi:Ai ×  i → R such that the following state-
ments hold.
• For any player j  = 1 2,a c t i o na∗j is strictly dominant.





probability no more than p1 −e1 and action a2
0 with the remaining probability.
• Action a1
+ is the strict best response of player 1 if player 2 plays action a2
− or a2
+
with probability no less than p1 +e1 and action a2
0 with the remaining probability.
• Action a2
− is the strict best response of player 2 if player 1 plays action a1
+ with
probability no more than p2 −e2 and action a2
− with the remaining probability.
• Action a2
0 is the strict best response of player 2 if player 1 plays action a1
+ with
probability in the interval (p2 − 1
2e2 p2 + 1
2e2) and action a2
− with the remaining
probability.
• Action a2
+ is the strict best response of player 2 if player 1 plays action a1
+ with
probability no less than p2 +e2 and action a2
− with the remaining probability.




+ is smaller than the lowest cost of deviation of player 1 from stage-game equi-
librium a∗.
• The absolute value of player 2 payoffs if player 1 plays one of the actions a1
− or a1
+
is smaller than the lowest cost of deviation of player 2 from stage-game equilib-
rium a∗.
We construct a nontrivial repeated game equilibrium. In odd periods t = 1 3 5    ,
all players play action proﬁle a∗.I ne v e np e r i o d st = 2 4 6    , the play depends on the
signals observed in the previous periods. Speciﬁcally, the following statements hold.
• Assuming that player 1 chose a1∗ in period t − 1,p l a y e r1 plays action a1
− if
ω1
t−1 ∈  1
−; otherwise, he plays a1
+.
• Assuming that player 2 chose a2∗ in period t − 1,p l a y e r2 plays action a2
− if
ω2
t−1 ∈  2
− and action a2
0 if ω2
t−1 = ω2∗; otherwise, he plays a1
+.
• Other players j  = 1 2 choose a∗j.
Because of the choice of payoffs, the play in the even periods is a stage-game corre-
lated equilibrium, and the signals from the previous period play the role of a correlating
device.
We verify that the above proﬁle is a strict repeated game equilibrium. Players j  = 1 2
have no reason to deviate from their stage-game dominant action a∗j. Because the cost
ofdeviation fromtheodd-periodstage-gameNash equilibrium outweighsany potential
gain for players 1 and 2, the two players follow the strategy in the odd periods. Because
the continuation play does not depend on the signals observed in the even periods, as-
suming that the players followed the equilibrium strategy in the previous period, the
equilibrium prescription is a best response in the even periods.
So far, we have discussed a game without payoff shocks. If the shocks are sufﬁciently
small, they do not change the fact that the prescribed actions are strict best responses
and the above strategy proﬁle remains a repeated game equilibrium.54 Marcin P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Finally, suppose  i are inﬁnite for all players and that ρ is a monitoring with ﬁ-
nite support (i.e., there are ﬁnite subsets  i
ρ ⊆  i such that for all action proﬁles a ∈ A,
ρ(× i i
ρ|a) = 1)a n ds u c ht h a tρ satisﬁes full support, CI, and SI when restricted to the
support. Consider any (possibly inﬁnite and connected) monitoring ρ  that is γ-close to
monitoring ρ in the sense of norm  · from Section 3.1. For sufﬁciently small γ>0,i fa
player observes a signal from the support of ρ, his posterior beliefs are very close to the
beliefs that he would hold under the monitoring ρ.
Consider strategies that play a∗ in the odd periods and that replicate the behavior
of the above constructed proﬁle in odd periods after signals from the support of ρ.F o r
sufﬁciently small γ>0, such a behavior is a best response behavior no matter what
the other players are doing on the small probability signals outside the support of ρ.
Using an appropriate equilibrium existence theorem (for incomplete information dy-
namic games with countably many types), we can complete the strategies on the signals
outside the support of ρ so that the strategies are best responses to each other after all
histories. Because of Theorem 3, strategies so obtained do not have a ﬁnite past.
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